EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY AS
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Do people really care about their states? Should federalism
scholars care if they care? Much of the current literature
assumes a negative answer to the first question. Edward
Rubin's and Malcolm Feeley's influential works, for example,
has long insisted that the states are basically lines on a mapthey are not different from one another in ways that matter to
constitutional law, and no one feels any particular attachment
to them. 1 Similarly, Jessica Bulman-Pozen states a common
view in noting that "[t]oday, individuals from Montana to
Mississippi to Maine can eat at the same restaurant chains,
shop at the same stores, read the same publications, and listen
to the same music." 2 The inference, again, is that because
many Americans have similar experiences regardless of
geography, states are just places where Americans happen to
live. 3
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Way Down" held from November 7 to 8, 2013. I am grateful to Melissa Hart and
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issue of same-sex marriage has been shaped by my work on the Brief of
Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), available at http://scholarship.
law.duke.edulfaculty scholarship/2858. I wish to thank my colleagues in that
effort-Jonathan Adler, Lynn Baker, Randy Barnett, Erin Blondel, Dale
Carpenter, Carina Cuellar, Roy Englert, and Ilya Somin-while making clear that
they would not necessarily agree with what I say here. Finally, as will be evident,
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The second question produces more disagreement. Dean
Rubin and Professor Feeley would answer "yes"; for them, the
death of meaningful state differentiation and identity is a
compelling reason to abandon federalism altogether as a
constitutional principle. 4 Other scholars, like my dear friend
Heather Gerken, would say "no. "5The importance of the states,
for this group, is that they slice the national electorate in
different ways, so that in at least some jurisdictions, national
minorities will find themselves in the majority. This gives
minorities a chance to actually exercise power-to "dissent by
deciding" from the majority view, giving life and institutional
form to policy alternatives that, at the national level, they
would have only the right to talk about.6 But it does not matter
whether a state's inhabitants feel any particular attachment to
that state; the important thing is that the correlation of
political forces in some states is different from that in others,
so that different jurisdictions are electing different sorts of
people.7
My own view is that the answer to the second question is,
"Yes, it matters whether people care about their states." (My
answer to the first one is, "I hope so, but it's really hard to
prove."8 ) This Essay explores whether state attachments

PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS

16-30 (2009) (concluding that "the

tectonic plates of culture are shifting . . . bringing the states closer together");
JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 53-79 (2005) (rejecting notions of "romantic
subnationalism").
4. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 150-53.
5. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down,
124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-17 (2010).
6. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745
(2005); see also Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founder's
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (book review) (observing that decentralized
power can satisfy a larger proportion of citizens' policy preferences, if the persons
holding those preferences are unevenly distributed geographically).
7. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1116-22 (arguing that individuals
identify with states only instrumentally, as a means of vindicating their national
partisan commitments).
8. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity,
Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American Federal System (Mar. 31,
2014 draft) (unpublished manuscript). One of my Colorado Law Review editors
helpfully reports that she strongly identifies with Colorado "and couldn't imagine
living in, say, Arizona or Utah"-but more systematic survey evidence is hard to
come by. This research is not impossible to perform. Considerable survey data
exists, for instance, on whether Europeans identify primarily with their Member
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matter through the lens of Albert Hirschman's seminal work,
"Exit, Voice, and Loyalty."9 Professor Hirschman argued that
people, in their roles as both consumers and citizens, can
respond to conditions they do not like in at least three different
ways. They can exit, by switching to another product or moving
to another jurisdiction; they can exercise voice, by complaining
about the product's quality or the government's policy and
perhaps offering constructive suggestions; or they can display
loyalty, sticking with the product or their home jurisdiction
despite their discontent.1 0 Both Hirschman and the extensive
literature based on his work have a lot to say about exit and
voice, but give relatively little attention to loyalty. This Essay
aims to take a small step toward filling that gap.
The continuing national controversy over same-sex
marriage provides a valuable case study. That controversy has
played out in a particularly federalist fashion. The gay-rights
movement's critical victories have come at the state level,
where a considerable number of jurisdictions have adopted
specific anti-discrimination provisions and have recognized
same-sex marriages. 1 I At the same time, many jurisdictions
have explicitly rejected same-sex unions. 12 The movement's
signature national win, the Supreme Court's invalidation of
Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)13 in
United States v. Windsor in 2013,14 removed a federal
constraint on state decisions to recognize same-sex marriage;
the decision itself did not create any federal marriage rights.' 5

States or with the European Union as a whole. See, e.g., THOMAS RISSE, A
COMMUNITY OF EUROPEANS? TRANSNATIONAL IDENTITIES AND PUBLIC SPHERES

(2010) (collecting extensive survey evidence).
9. ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
10. See id. at 36-38.

I1. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 30.
13. Pub. L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2014)).
14. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). The movement's other national success,
course, was the elimination of the "don't ask, don't tell" policy in
of
the military. See Obama Certifies End of Military's Gay Ban,
NBCNEWS.COM (July 22, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43859711/ns/usnews-life/#.UlCwmPldVmc. That victory occurred in a context in which the states
effectively do not exist, except in their secondary role with respect to the reserves.
15. It may be that, in Windsor's wake, the federal government will
affirmatively recognize same-sex unions in contexts where state law would not so
require. But the Court's actual holding in Windsor does not mandate that step.

1136

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

And, as I discuss further below, Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Windsor eschewed a rationale based on stand-alone
federal rights of equal protection or due process in favor of a
theory grounded fundamentally in the relevant state's decision
to recognize Edith Windsor's marriage. 16
I am less focused here on Windsor's legal rationale than on
the structural dynamics of our federal system as they bear on
same-sex marriage. 17 Obviously, gay couples can and do exit
particular jurisdictions that are not congenial to recognizing
and protecting their rights. Same-sex marriage advocates may
also exercise voice, by pushing for marriage equality in their
home jurisdictions and, where they find themselves in the local
majority, enacting laws recognizing same-sex marriage. I argue
here that the combination of exit and voice has been
particularly important in the same-sex marriage debate. It
seems likely that, for many heterosexuals, particularly those of
a traditionalist bent, same-sex marriage has to be seen to be
believed in-that is, people who find the abstract concept of
same-sex marriage unfamiliar and off-putting may be more
likely to change their mind when they see same-sex couples
practicing a domestic life that, well, looks just like a family.
The potential for exit in our system-more importantly, the
mere fact that different jurisdictions can adopt different
policies-is what generates those real-world examples. And
those examples, in turn, render same-sex marriage advocates'
voice even more powerful in those jurisdictions that are still on
the fence.
I am particularly interested, however, in Professor
Hirschman's neglected third concept: loyalty. We need to ask at
least three questions about loyalty. First, what precisely does it
entail? Second, where does it come from and why does it arise?

See generally 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
16. See id. at 2692 ("The State's decision to give this class of persons the right
to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import. When the
State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in this
way, its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition,
dignity, and protection of the class in their own community.").
17. For a doctrinal account, see Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel,
Federalism, Liberty, and Equality in United States v. Windsor, 2013 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 117 (2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edulcgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=5845&context=faculty-scholarship (identifying the multiple ways in
which Justice Kennedy relied upon federalism in Windsor).
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And third, how does it interact with the other two options, exit
and voice? My hope is that this exploration of loyalty can shed
some light on the question with which I began: Does it matter
whether people care about-i.e., feel loyalty to-their states?
Loyalty, after all, is the only one of Hirschman's categories that
is not captured by the "different electoral slice" theories of
Professor Gerken and others. If loyalty turns out to be
intimately bound up with exit and voice, as I believe it is, then
scholars will need to pay closer attention to the cultural
underpinnings of federalism. States matter for more than
simply how they divide up the political map.
Part I of this Essay discusses exit and voice as they bear on
the same-sex marriage controversy. Part II turns to loyalty. A
brief conclusion follows.
I.

EXIT AND VOICE IN THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE

Individual states began to talk about legalizing same-sex
marriage in the 1990s. The initial moves came through state
supreme court interpretations of state constitutions. In 1993,
Hawaii's supreme court signaled that it was ready to recognize
same-sex couples' right to marry under the state's equal
protection clause, 18 prompting reactions in both the state
legislature and in Congress. Citing the Hawaii decision,
Congress enacted DOIA three years later. 19 DOIA did two
things. Section 2 clarified that no state would be required to
recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states. 20
Section 3 amended the Dictionary Act-the portion of Title I of
the U.S. Code that defines the meaning of terms that occur in
acts of Congress and other federal legal materials. 2 1 Section 3
18. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that the state's refusal
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples was subject to strict scrutiny under
the state's Equal Protection Clause and remanding to the trial court for
application of that standard).
19. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 4-11 (1996), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-104hrpt664/pdf/CRPT-104hrpt664.pdf.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2014) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United
States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim
arising from such relationship.").
21. See id. §§ 1-8.
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provided:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of
any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
"spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife. 2 2
In so providing, DOMA amended more than one thousand
federal statutes that include the words "marriage" or "spouse,"
and it altered the administration of innumerable federal
regulations and programs. 23 Prior to DOMA, federal law hadabsent specific exceptions tied to specific regulatory
circumstances-simply taken couples to be married if they
were married under state law. 24
Initial responses to same-sex unions at the state level were
equally negative. By 2000, nearly forty states (including
Hawaii) banned same-sex marriage by statute or state
constitutional amendment, although a number of them
conferred some degree of legal recognition on same-sex
unions. 25 But beginning in 2003, state supreme courts in
Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, and
New Mexico recognized a state constitutional right to marry for
same-sex couples. 2 6 Vermont was the first state to recognize
same-sex marriage by legislative enactment in 2009; by 2014,
Vermont would be followed by New Hampshire, the District of
Columbia, New York, Delaware, Minnesota, Rhode Island,
Hawaii, and Illinois. 2 7 Popular referendums in Maryland,
22. Id. § 7.
23. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013).
24. See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956).
25. 17 States with Legal Gay Marriageand 33 States with Same-Sex Marriage
Bans, PROCON.ORG (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://gaymarriage.procon.org/
view.resource.php?resourceID=004857#.
26. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); In re
Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Lewis
v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, 458 (2006) (holding that restriction of same sex marriage
violates the New Jersey state constitution); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M.
2013).
27. 13 DEL. CODE § 101 (2013); D.C. CODE § 46-401 (2014); HAW. REV. STAT. §
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Maine, and Washington legalized same-sex marriage in 2012
and 2013.28 At present, same-sex marriage is legal in seventeen
states and prohibited in thirty-three states. 2 9 Notwithstanding
the considerable number of states that have affirmatively
rejected same-sex marriage (many of them recently), 30 public
opinion analysis strongly suggests that the trend toward
legalization will continue. 3 1 But, as many wise people have
pointed out, it's tough to make predictions-especially about
the future. 32
The important point for present purposes is that we
currently see both (a) a classic federalist patchwork of laws on

572-1.8 (2013); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/10 (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a
(2014); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 13 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 517.08 (2014); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-1-1 (2013); 15 VT. STAT. ANN. § 8 (2013). Legislation also followed in
some states that had initially recognized same-sex marriage rights by judicial
decision. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-35b (2014).
28. See ME. REV. STAT., tit. 19-A § 650-A (2014); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §
2-201 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (2014).
29. PROCON.ORG, supra note 25.
30. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03; ARIz. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; ARK. CONST.
amend. 83; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 27; GA. CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. III, §
28; KAN CONST. art. 15, § 16; KY. CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH.
CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263A; MO. CONST. art. I, § 33; MONT.
CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. article I, § 29; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6; N.D.
CONST. art. XI, § 28; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D.
CONST. art. XXII, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 32; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; VA.
CONST. art. I, § 15-A; IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2014); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-101
(2014).
31. See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, A Marriageof Necessity: Religious Liberty
Protections in Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (collecting data). Ace pollster Nate Silver concludes:
[E]ven if one prudently assumes that support for same-sex marriage is
increasing at a linear rather than accelerated pace, and that same-sex
marriage will not perform quite as well at the ballot booth as in national
polls of all adults, the steady increase in support is soon likely to
outweigh all other factors. In fact, even if the Supreme Court decision or
some other contingency freezes opinion among current voters, support
for same-sex marriage would continue to increase based on generational
turnover, probably enough that it would narrowly win a national ballot
referendum by 2016.
Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage is Changing, and What It
Means, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.
nytimes.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-andwhat-it-means/? r=0.
32. The line is attributed to an impressive array of people, including Yogi
Berra, Neils Bohr, and Mark Twain. It's Difficult to Make Predictions,Especially
About the Future, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Oct. 20, 2013), http://quoteinvestigator.
com/2013/10/20/no-predict/.
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same-sex marriage and (b) an ongoing public debate on the
subject across the whole country. Several recent decisions by
lower federal courts suggest a possible nationwide resolution
under the Equal Protection Clause, 33 but there are no
guarantees. At first glance, the exit and voice dynamics in the
same-sex marriage debate seem obvious and straightforward.
As long as the recognition of same-sex marriage is a question to
be resolved state-by-state, same-sex couples can exit a
jurisdiction that refuses them recognition and seek a more
hospitable one. Similarly, opponents of same-sex marriage
whose states have moved beyond the traditional heterosexual
paradigm. may depart for a jurisdiction more congenial to their
views. On the voice side, both proponents and opponents who
choose to stay in a state that has policies contrary to their
preferences can work within that political system to bring
about a different result, similar to how the proponents of
California's Proposition 8 successfully overturned the
California Supreme Court's recognition of same-sex unions
under the state constitution. 34
There are, however, more complex dynamics at work. As
Professor Gerken's work suggests, federalism allows groups
making up a minority at the national level to not only advocate

their viewpoint but to implement it, whenever they compose a
majority at the state level. 35 On one level, of course, actually
legislating one's views is not simply voice-it is power. But in
the midst of the current ferment, each state's decision to

recognize same-sex marriage has a dual aspect. The state
legislates for its own citizens, but each new enactment or court
decision that accepts or rejects same-sex marriage is also an
entry in a larger national debate. 36 This is one reason Gerken
33. De Leon v. Perry, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26236 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014)
(holding that Texas's same-sex marriage ban violated the Equal Protection
Clause); Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4374, 2014
WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (striking down Oklahoma's same-sex
marriage ban on equal protection grounds); Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 179331, at 28 (D. Utah Dec. 20, 2013) (holding that Utah restriction on
same sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause).
34. See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 744 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927-28 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (discussing the history of California's Proposition 8).
35. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 6, at 1754-55. See also
Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1351 (2013)
(embracing federalism's potential in this regard more fully).
36. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1100-05.
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characterizes the power of a national minority to legislate in a
jurisdiction where it forms a majority as a form of "dissent"that is, from the prevailing view at the national level. 3 7
This exercise of power at the state level by national
minorities is, of course, what makes exit possible: you cannot
exit if there is no place to go. Moreover, the mere existence of
states like Vermont, which recognize same-sex marriage, may
affect the debate in a nearby state like Pennsylvania, which is
on the fence. The recognition of same-sex unions in Vermont
and several other states makes the threat of exit by same-sex
couples in Pennsylvania more credible, 38 which may influence
Pennsylvania's policy to the extent that it fears out-migration
of productive citizens and taxpayers.
Equally important, Vermont's example may affect debates
about same-sex marriage in other states. There is a huge
difference between an abstract proposal (which any nut can
make) and a policy enacted by the legislature of a sister state. 3 9
Another state government's adoption of same-sex marriage
thus has a legitimizing effect, adding gravitas to the voices of
same-sex marriage advocates in Pennsylvania and elsewhere.
By the same token, it is less easy to dismiss opponents of samesex marriage as bigots when dozens of states have adopted
their views as state policy. Americans know that while any
extremist can grab a microphone, convincing a large
governmental unit to adopt a position generally requires the
support of many centrists.
Adoption of a policy by one jurisdiction also has an
important demonstrative effect. Hence, advocates of same-sex
marriage can point to Vermont for an example of what a world
with same-sex marriage would look like. Some evidence
suggests support for gay rights is closely linked to familiarity

37. See, e.g., Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 61-63.
38. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 9, at 5 (observing that "if voice is to be at its
most effective, the threat of exit must be credible").
39. Even acts of pure protest, such as the resolutions by the Virginia and
Kentucky legislatures condemning the Alien and Sedition Acts in the early
Republic, are likely to have more power when adopted through a state
government's deliberative processes than when promulgated by private entities.
See, e.g., Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism:A New Defense of the AntiCommandeeringRule?, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1309, 1324-27 (2000) (describing the
expressive powers of state governments).
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with gay individuals. 4 0 While that research assesses the impact
of person-to-person interactions, it seems plausible that a more
diffuse form of familiarity effect might exist as well. Americans
know that the sky has not fallen in Vermont since the state
recognized same-sex marriages in 2009, and no one has turned
into a pillar of salt. When almost 40 percent of the United
States population lives in a jurisdiction that recognizes samesex marriages, it becomes more difficult to portray those
marriages as weird or un-American. 4 1 To the extent that any of
this is true, Vermont's decision enhances the voice of same-sex
marriage advocates in Pennsylvania and other states.
Exit options may enhance voice in other ways, too. They
may reduce the potential costs of voice by allowing dissenters
to leave the jurisdiction if their advocacy causes a backlash.
This may be particularly important on issues like same-sex
marriage, where the moral stakes and the temperature of
public debate are high.
There is also what we might call "mundane exit"-that is,
movement from one state to another not as a permanent
response to dissatisfaction but simply as part of the reality of
life in an integrated federal republic. The ordinary relocation of
same-sex couples from one jurisdiction on account of career
opportunities, the pull of extended families, or desire for a
place in the sun creates legal friction as different jurisdictions
must figure out how to treat relationships entered into under a
different legal regime. This friction may create pressure for
jurisdictions to moderate their policy, as states likely will want
to minimize the extent to which their marriage laws deter
potential immigrants from moving to the state. At the very
least, mundane exit seems likely to ensure that the issue of
same-sex marriage will remain alive until we more or less

40. See, e.g., Shawn Neidorf & Rich Morin, Four-in-Ten Americans Have Close
Friends or Relatives Who are Gay, PEW RES. CTR. (May 22, 2007), http://www.
pewresearch.org/2007/05/22/fourinten-americans-have-close-friends-or-relativeswho-are-gay (reporting poll findings that "[pleople who have a close gay friend or
family member are more likely to support gay marriage and they are also
significantly less likely to favor allowing schools to fire gay teachers than are
those with little or no personal contact with gays").
41. Eliana Dockterman, These are the Next Gay-Marriage Battlegrounds,
TIME, Nov. 10, 2013, http://nation.time.com/2013/11/10/these-are-the-next-gaymarriage-battlegrounds ("With Illinois, we have 37% of American people living in
a freedom-to-marry state . . . .") (quoting Alan Wolfson of Freedom to Marry).
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reach some sort of national consensus. No matter how settled
the issue may seem in any particular jurisdiction, that
resolution may continually be disrupted by people moving in
and out for other reasons (and bringing their views on samesex marriage with them).
Finally, part of the same-sex marriage debate concerns
"internal exit"-that is, the possibility that some objectors
(particularly religious ones) might be allowed to opt out of the
state's recognition of same-sex marriage. Disputes are already
arising concerning whether photographers or bakers, for
example, may refuse to provide services for same-sex marriages
based on their personal moral objections. 42 Allowing such optouts may reduce opposition to recognizing same-sex marriage
by enhancing the voice of proponents while preserving the
rights of opponents to "dissent by deciding" within the scope of
their own affairs. 4 3 Similar opt-outs exist, for example, in the
federal housing discrimination laws, which exempt owneroccupant landlords with less than four units. 4 4 At some point,
of course, such opt-outs undermine the force of the law that the
community wishes to adopt, and that sacrifice may well be
unacceptable for laws that embody a strong moral imperative. 4 5
But for communities that have not yet reached consensus on an
issue, internal exit options may present a means to soften the
blow of defeat for local minorities.
42. See, e.g., Liz Halloran, No Cake for You: Saying 'I Don't' to Same-Sex
Marriage, NPR (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/10/250098572/nocake-for-you-saying-i-dont-to-same-sex-marriage; Kari Bray, Gresham Bakery that
Refused to Bake Same-Sex Wedding Cake Closes Shop, OREGONLIVE (Sept.
1, 2013), http://www.oregonlive.com/greshamlindex.ssf/2013/09/gresham bakerythat refused to.html. These disputes have arisen even in jurisdictions that do not
officially recognize same-sex marriage. In the leading litigated dispute, Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013), the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that a photographer violated the state's public
accommodations statute, which forbids discrimination based on sexual
orientation. The dispute arose in 2006, seven years before the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional, under the state constitution, not
to permit same-sex couples to marry. See also Griego v. Oliver, 2013 N.M. LEXIS
414, at *10 (N.M. Dec. 19, 2013).
43. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 31.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2014) (the famous "Mrs. Murphy" exemption). See
also Scott M. Badami, The FHA's "Mrs. Murphy" Exemption-A 50 State Guide,
MONDAQ.COM (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/235406/
real+estate/The+FHAs+Mrs+Murphy+Exemption+A+50+State+Guide.
45. In some instances, moreover, "individual exit" may create serious freerider problems.
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DOMA had a dual impact on these dynamics of exit and
voice. On the one hand, Section 2 removed a potentially
complicating factor-the possible obligation, under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 46 of one state to recognize same-sex
marriages entered into in another state. Even without DOMA,
contemporary interpretations of the states' full faith and credit
obligations likely would not have required states prohibiting
same-sex marriage to recognize such marriages solemnized by
other states. 47 But the Clause also empowers Congress "by
general laws" to "prescribe . . . the effect" of state "acts," and

Congress invoked this power to make sure that each state
could decide, on its own, whether same-sex marriages would be
recognized within its jurisdiction. By doing so, Congress
substantially reduced pressure to nationalize the issue. If
Vermont's decision to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples, for example, meant that Texas or Kansas would have
to recognize those marriages, then the substantial majority of
states opposing same-sex marriage would have had powerful
incentives to seek a categorical federal ban. 48
Although DOMA gave the states some autonomy with one
hand, it took back that autonomy with the other. Section 3
prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages for all federal
purposes. 49 This meant that, for all aspects of their lives
46. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
47. See generally William Baude, What About Full Faith and Credit?, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 14, 2011, 11:53 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/
12/14/what-about-full-faith-and-credit/. Basically, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires strict adherence to another state's judgments but not to its laws.
See, e.g., Baker ex rel. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-33 (1998).
Hence, a state may invoke its own public policy in refusing to recognize marriages
entered into in another state. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage,
Conflict of Laws, and the UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J.
1965 (1997) (arguing that DOMA § 2 was not necessary under current law, but
urging that current law should be rejected).
48. Cf. Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 117-28 (2001) (describing how
coalitions of states use Congress as an instrument to impose their preferences on
other states). It is not obvious that Congress would have had the enumerated
power to enact such a ban, but at least since Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), one would be unwise to count on anything being found outside the scope of
the commerce power.
49. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2014).
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governed by federal law, same-sex couples could not exit
without leaving the country entirely. Likewise, any exercise of
voice with respect to those aspects would have to be directed to
the national community as a whole, which remained-until
very recently indeed-profoundly
hostile to same-sex
marriage. 50
More
subtly,
DOMA imposed
countless
administrative complications on states wishing to recognize
same-sex marriage. Those states could no longer piggyback
their state income taxes on the federal definition of "income"
for same-sex married couples, for example, and state officials
administering interlocking state and federal benefit schemes
would have to work out difficult conflicts in the respective
definitions of family. 5 1 As Justice Kennedy observed in
Windsor, DOMA's purpose was "to discourage enactment of
state same-sex marriage laws..

.

. The congressional goal was

'to put a thumb on the scales and influence a state's decision as
to how to shape its own marriage laws."' 52
The Supreme Court's decision in Windsor thus removed an
important impediment to the ordinary dynamics of exit and
voice. Windsor involved a same-sex couple who had lived
together in New York and whose marriage had been recognized
under the laws of that state. 53 The Court stressed the central
role of New York law, noting that "[tihe State's decision to give
this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a
dignity and status of immense import." 54 Until the Court
revisits the issue and considers whether the federal
constitution mandates recognition of same-sex marriages,
50. See, e.g., Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RESEARCH (Mar.
2014), available at http://features.pewforum.org/same-sex-marriage-attitudes/
(stating that "in 2001, Americans opposed same-sex marriage by a 57% to 35%
margin"). The first year in which Pew found a majority of Americans supporting
same-sex marriage was 2011. See id.
51. See generally Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 32-38, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12307).
52. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Serv., 682 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2012)).
53. See id. at 2683.
54. Id. at 2692. This is not the place to debate the extent to which Windsor
relied on federalism principles. Compare, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Federalismas a Way
Station: Windsor as Exemplar of Doctrine in Motion, _ J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
(forthcoming 2014),
available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edulfacultyscholarship/3233 (expressing skepticism that it did), with Young & Blondel, supra
note 17, at 133-44 (arguing that federalism was critical).
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individual state jurisdictions will make their own decisions
without DOMA's "thumb on the scales." Exit and voice will
continue to play critical roles in those debates.
II. LOYALTY
What about loyalty? For Professor Hirschman, loyalty is
simply the decision not to exit. Brand loyalty, for consumers,
means sticking with a product despite dissatisfaction.
Similarly, citizen loyalty means simply not packing up and
leaving every time your community does something you do not
like.5 5 We might aspire to a somewhat thicker definition,
however. For George Fletcher, "loyalty is the beginning of
political life, a life in which interaction with others becomes the
primary means of solving problems." 56 This suggests not
merely staying put but also a commitment to membership in a
community with others-presumably despite the occasional
disagreement with fellow members. We might think political
loyalty has an internal dimension as well-a sense of identity
with the community that does not depend on complete
congruence between the community's policies and one's own
preferences.
Many reasons that people do not exit when jurisdictions
adopt policies contrary to their preferences will not fit well
within this thicker definition. Although Americans think of
themselves as a mobile society, the truth is that we are not
anywhere near mobile enough to move in response to every
policy disagreement with our home jurisdiction.5 7 Moving is
expensive, time-consuming, and disruptive. The 2010 Census
found that 58.8 percent of all people in the United States were
residing in their state (or district) of birth.5 8 These numbers do
55.

See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 9, at 38.

56. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 5 (1993). See also MORTON GRODZINS, THE LOYAL AND
THE DISLOYAL 5-6 (1956) ("[S]ocial structure of every sort . . . rests upon

loyalties: upon attitudes and actions directed at supporting groups, ideas, and
institutions.. . . Loyalties provide [the individual] with a portion of the framework
upon which he organizes his existence.").
57. See, e.g., Douglas A. Wolf & Charles F. Longino, Jr., Our "Increasingly
Mobile Society"? The Curious Persistence of a False Belief, 45 THE
GERONTOLOGIST 5 (2005) (demonstrating that contemporary Americans are less
mobile than they think).
58. Ping Ren, Lifetime Mobility in the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS
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not capture the number of times people have moved, but it
seems safe to say that most Americans move only infrequently,
if at all. 59 Certainly they do not move in response to every, or
even most, of the government decisions that they disagree
with. 60
Even if moving were easy, it is an all-or-nothing response
to a jurisdiction that inevitably offers an array of policies on a
wide variety of issues. Same-sex couples that long for marriage
rights in North Carolina (which approved a ban in 2012)61 may
remain because they like the business-friendly regulatory
climate or the quality of the public schools. And only some of
the factors that influence decisions about relocation are within
the control of governments. Our North Carolina couple may
stick around because they like four moderate seasons, great
college basketball, or even because they harbor an inexplicable
preference for pork barbecue. There may be some issues on
which people are prepared to be single-issue movers, and for at
least some people, same-sex marriage may be one of them. But
I suspect that most people, on most questions, will not exercise
their exit rights simply because the overall policy mix on offer
in a state remains congenial to them.
Unlike the sheer difficulty of moving, satisfaction with the
overall policy mix in a state may begin to push people toward a
thicker notion of loyalty-that is, they may buy in to the
BUREAU, Nov. 2011, at 2, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/
acsbr10-07.pdf. The same census found that 27 percent were born in another state
and the remaining 14 percent were born abroad or in a United States territory. Id.
Professor Bulman-Pozen interprets similar statistics to show that Americans are
very mobile. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1110-11. To some extent, this is
a glass half-full versus half-empty judgment. I do think it supports the point in
text, which is simply that exit is not a likely response to any particular
dissatisfaction for most people, most of the time.
59. See, e.g., Wolf & Longino, supra note 57, at 6 (analyzing multiple
measures, including annual mobility statistics, to conclude that overall mobility is
declining); Gregg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, Understanding the Long-Run
Decline in Interstate Migration, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working
Paper 697, at 1 (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/
research/wp/wp697.pdf (stating that in the 1990s, only "about 3 percent of
Americans moved between states each year," and that "[tioday, that rate has
fallen by half').
60. See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1169 (emphasizing the significant costs of moving); Phyllis Korkki, How Portable
Is Your Life?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/
jobs/07search.html? r=0 (discussing the personal costs and benefits of moving).
61. See N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.

1148

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

general project of state governance on some version of the "in
for a penny, in for a pound" principle. Exit and voice options
may enhance this dynamic. To the extent that people can move,
they are more likely to view the legal obligations imposed by
the home jurisdiction as freely chosen. And to the extent they
have a voice-a meaningful role in shaping those obligationsthey may be more likely to accept the outcome of state
democratic processes even when their side loses.
At the end of the day, even those who remain in a
particular jurisdiction simply because of resource constraints,
family obligations, or sheer inertia may nonetheless develop a
deeper attachment to the state out of familiarity and habit.
Many of our most compelling personal loyalties-to family, for
instance, or home-town sports teams 62 -are not freely chosen. 63
One way to define loyalty is as the persistent attitude that a
particular jurisdiction's policies have a legitimate claim on the
citizen irrespective of that citizen's preferences, 64 as well as a
presumption that that jurisdiction remains the relevant unit to
which efforts at reform should be addressed. Or, we could use
something akin to William Mackenzie's elegant formulation of
"political identity" as an answer to the question, "in what
context do 'I' properly use the word 'we'?" 65 Either way, habit is
likely to play an important role. 66
For Professor Hirschman, the primary role of loyalty was
to "activate voice."67 Simply by retarding exit, loyalty makes it
more likely that individuals will stay in a jurisdiction and press
for change within rather than seek a more congenial regime
elsewhere. But loyalty may enhance voice in other ways, too. 68
62. Does anyone deliberately choose to be Cubs fan? See, e.g., Why am I a
Chicago Cubs Fan?, CHICITYSPORTS.COM (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.
chicitysports.com/2011/03/25/why-am-i-a-chicago-cubs-fan/ ("I grew up with them,
watching or listening to the Cubs on WGN with my brothers and my dad.").
63. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the Good, in MICHAEL SANDEL,
ED., LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 172 (1984).
64. See, e.g., CRODZINS, supra note 56, at 21 ("When citizens say or think 'we'
in referring to the actions of government, even the most abominable acts are
difficult to condemn. Condemnation under the circumstances is self-damnation;
and to avoid this kind of injury to self, prodigious mental feats may be
performed.").
65. WILLIAM JAMES MILLAR MACKENZIE, POLITICAL IDENTITY 12 (1978).
66. See GRODZINS, supra note 56, at 35.
67. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 9, at 78.
68. If I can be forgiven a technical Federal Courts point, members of a
community also are more likely to be directly affected by the community's policies;
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To the extent that dissenters are longstanding members of the
community, their record of loyalty may have brought them
power and prestige that make them more effective advocates
for change. Moreover, loyalty means that dissenters are
committed to membership in the same community as the
majority, and that commitment is likely to reflect a certain set
of shared values and principles. If dissenters formulate their
arguments for reform in terms of those shared values and
principles, their arguments are likely to be far more powerful
than more abstract appeals to justice. It is no coincidence that
the Civil Rights Movement's most compelling arguments were
grounded in the Declaration of Independence and the Bible. 69
Loyalty may also enhance the value of the victory when
and if dissenters ultimately prevail. In the same-sex marriage
context, for example, the ultimate goal is surely not simply
legal recognition of same-sex unions but the full acceptance of
gay married couples as equal members of the community. The
positive laws reach only so far, and this ultimate acceptance
cannot be mandated by a legislature or a court. Acceptance
seems likely to come more readily, however, if it is the decision
of a community to which the opponent is himself loyal. If
opponents are committed to membership in a state that
ultimately adopts same-sex marriage, that feeling of
membership may press them to embrace that decision as
"theirs," even though they found themselves on the losing
end. 70 This may be more likely if the decision is reached
through democratic processes rather than judicial fiat, but to
the extent that state constitutional provisions are perceived to

thus, they will have legal standing to challenge that policy in a way that
opponents living elsewhere will not. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759
(1984) (insisting that plaintiffs be inhabitants of the communities in which the
impact of the challenged policies were felt).
69. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail (1963),
available at http://www.africa.upenn.edulArticlesGentLetter Birmingham.html
(appealing to a common religious tradition shared with white supporters of
segregation). See generally ANDREW M. MANIS, SOUTHERN CIVIL RELIGIONS IN

CONFLICT: BLACK AND WHITE BAPTISTS AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1947-1957 (1987)
(documenting Civil Rights Movement appeals to common civil religion based on
the Declaration and other founding principles).
70. Consider every faculty appointments candidate you have ever voted
against, but then welcomed into the law school community with open arms. Why?
Because once the faculty votes, loyal members of the community accept that
decision as their own even if they disagreed.
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reflect a state's political character, 7 1 opponents may feel some
sense of ownership even when marriage equality occurs by
judicial decision.
What I have said about loyalty so far should suggest a way
of resolving my disagreement with Professor Gerken. Recall
that the basic theories of exit and voice rely primarily on the
role of states in slicing the electorate in diverse ways, so that
national minorities will sometimes find themselves in the local
majority and, more generally, different correlations of political
forces exist in each jurisdiction. The question is whether we
should care whether states are anything more than thatwhether
they represent
meaningful
and
distinctive
communities to which people form some sort of attachment.
Ultimately, that question is about whether states are objects of
loyalty.
States need not be communities of value, of course, in
order to retard exit; the sheer pain-in-the-neck aspect of
moving does that in many instances. In order to choose
between the "different electoral slice" view and the
"communities of value" view, we need to know not only how
important loyalty is but how thick we need it to be. As I have
suggested, loyalty will play its role most effectively where it
embodies not only a reluctance to move but also a feeling of
membership in a common community and a commitment to,
even a sense of ownership of, that community's decisions. That
sort of loyalty will exist only where states become more than
lines on a map. After all, congressional districts also slice the
electorate in different ways, but I feel nowhere near the same
sense of membership and attachment about the Fourth
Congressional District that I feel toward North Carolina (or
even the lovely city of Durham).
I prefer a thicker loyalty for a second reason as well. Anna
Stilz's recent work, "Liberal Loyalty," assesses whether
someone starting from liberal premises might nonetheless be
justified in feeling particular obligations to a specific political
community, rather than to all mankind. She concludes that one
should, because particular communities play a crucial role in
71. See generally JAMES T. MCHUGH, Ex UNO PLURA: STATE CONSTITUTIONS
AND THEIR POLITICAL CULTURES (2003) (arguing that state constitutions do
reflect the distinctive political cultures of particular states); G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998) (same).
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defining vital principles of equal freedom that would otherwise
remain abstract and indeterminate. 7 2 Professor Stilz might
resist the comparison, but her view seems to resonate with the
more Burkean notion that natural rights can be given meaning
only within specific historical communities. 73 I would further
submit that this process of community definition of rights is
particularly important with respect to an issue like same-sex
marriage, which depends on the interpretation of customary
values about family and marital commitment. 7 4
Finally, thicker loyalties are essential to maintaining a
community's commitment to its principles, once those
principles are defined. Martha Nussbaum's recent work has
insisted that even a liberal society cannot maintain itself
without drawing on emotion as well as reason. 75 Such emotions
are necessary, she writes, "to engender and sustain strong
commitment to worthy projects that require effort and
sacrifice-such as social redistribution, the full inclusion of
previously excluded or marginalized groups, the protection of
the environment, foreign aid, and the national defense." 76
"Most people," she recognizes, "tend toward narrowness of
sympathy"; hence, "all decent societies need to guard against
division and hierarchy by cultivating appropriate sentiments of
sympathy and love." 77 From this perspective, it seems likely
that people who would deny the right of same-sex couples to
marry as an abstract moral matter may be more likely to
accept and respect those marriages if they see same-sex couples
as members of a community to whom they are united by

72. See ANNA STILZ, LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEDOM, OBLIGATION, AND THE
STATE 40, 57-60 (2009).
73. See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 51

(Frank M. Turner ed., 2003) (1790) (recognizing that "[g]overnment is not made in
virtue of natural rights, which may and do exist in total independence of it. ...
But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times and circumstances, and
admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any abstract
rule. . . ."); see also Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political
Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 642-59 (1994)
(exploring this aspect of Burke's thought).
74. See generally Ernest A. Young, Custom, Constitutional Rights, and
Geography (unpublished draft) (on file with author).
75. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS
FOR JUSTICE (2013).

76.

Id. at 3.

77.

Id.
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common bonds of communal sympathy.78
From this perspective, a key virtue of state loyalties is that
they cut across other commitments, such as party or religion. 79
That is not to minimize the importance of those other
commitments. Indeed, as Professor Bulman-Pozen has shown,
partisan loyalties may often strengthen state attachments
because the state becomes an institutional vehicle to vindicate
partisan views.80 But those state attachments, regardless of
the reason they form in the first place, can also offer common
ground once the state takes a position on a particular issue.
Loyalty thus plays a crucial role in undergirding the dynamics
of exit and voice.
CONCLUSION

None of this is to say that the diversity of electoral slices
created by federalism does not matter-of course it does. The
fact that the correlation of political forces differs from state to
state drives much of the dynamic of exit and voice that I
discussed in Part I. It is worth remembering that this diversity
is both an effect as well as a cause of the significant and
persistent differences in life in particular state jurisdictionsthat is, the different proportions of Republicans and
Democrats, conservatives and liberals in different states is not
simply a product of random distribution but also responds to
the differing geography, economic base, migration patterns,
and historical experience of each state. In other words, the
diverse electoral compositions of the states may be more
intrinsic to each state than many analysts recognize.
That leaves the question whether a healthy federal system
needs more than diversity. I have suggested that we do, but it
78. Professor Nussbaum's argument, of course, replicates from a liberal
perspective an argument about the importance of emotional commitments that
has long been a staple of conservative thought. See BURKE, supra note 73, at 2930 (observing that the English "have given to our frame of polity the image of a
relation in blood; binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest
domestic ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family
affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth of all their
combined and mutually reflected charities, our state, our hearths, our sepulchers,
and our altars").
79. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2220-23 (1998).
80. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1116-22.
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is important to acknowledge that I have not proven anything
about whether the kind of thick loyalty to state political
communities I am looking for actually exists. A number of
commentators have asserted that it does not,8 1 but that is an
empirical question and none of the state-identity skeptics has
been able to marshall much in the way of evidence that state
loyalties in this country have died out. Developing affirmative
evidence that meaningful state loyalties survive in twenty-first
century America is a much bigger project, which I cannot
undertake here. 82 I do hope to have shown that the question
matters, and that it deserves more attention from federalism
scholars than it has heretofore received. Loyalty is more than
just being stuck someplace, and we will not realize the full
power of Professor Hirschman's categories until we explore
what else it might mean.

81.

See, e.g., FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 1, at 115-23; SCHAPIRO, supra note

3, at 1-6; Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1109-13.
82. See Young, supra note 8.
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